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Many people view news on social media, yet the production of news items
online has come under fire because of the common spreading of misinforma-
tion. Social media platforms police their content in various ways. Primarily
they rely on crowdsourced ‘flags’: users signal to the platform that a specific
news item might be misleading and, if they raise enough of them, the item
will be fact-checked. However, real-world data show that the most flagged
news sources are also the most popular and—supposedly—reliable ones.
In this paper, we show that this phenomenon can be explained by the unrea-
sonable assumptions that current content policing strategies make about how
the online social media environment is shaped. The most realistic assumption
is that confirmation bias will prevent a user from flagging a news item if they
share the same political bias as the news source producing it. We show, via
agent-based simulations, that a model reproducing our current understanding
of the social media environment will necessarily result in the most neutral and
accurate sources receiving most flags.1. Introduction
Social media have a central role to play in the dissemination of news [1]. There is a
general concern about the lowquality and reliability of information viewed online:
researchers have dedicated increasing amounts of attention to the problem of so-
called fake news [2–4]. Given the current ecosystemof news consumption and pro-
duction,misinformation shouldbeunderstoodwithin the complex set of social and
technical phenomenaunderlyingonline newspropagation, such as echo chambers
[5–10], platform-induced polarization [11,12] and selective exposure [13,14].
Over the years two main approaches have emerged to try to address the
problem of fake news by limiting its circulation: a technical approach and an
expert-based approach. The technical approach aims at building predictive
models able to detect misinformation [15,16]. This is often done using one or
more features associated with the message, such as content (through natural
language processing (NLP) approaches [17]), source reliability [18] or network
structure [19]. While these approaches have often produced promising results,
the limited availability of training data as well as the unavoidable subjectivity
involved in labelling a news item as fake [20,21] constitute a major obstacle to
wider development.
The alternative expert-based approach consists of a fact-checker on the
specific topic that investigates and evaluates each claim. While this could be
the most accurate way to deal with misinformation, given the amount of
news that circulates on social media every second, it is hard to imagine how
this could scale to the point of being effective. For this reason, the dominant
approach, which has recently also been adopted by Facebook,1 is based on a
combination of methods that first use computationally detected crowd signals,
often constituted by users flagging what they consider fake or misleading infor-
mation, and then assigning selected news items to external professional fact-
checkers for further investigation [22,23]. Although flagging-based systems
remain, to the best of our knowledge, widely used, many authors have ques-
tioned their reliability, showing how users can flag news items for reasons
Table 1. The top 10 most flagged domains among the Italian links shared
on the Facebook URL Shares dataset.
domain reported PVPM type
1 repubblica.it 270.00 54.00 national
newspaper
2 ilfattoquotidiano.it 85.00 21.00 national
newspaper
3 corriere.it 83.00 30.00 national
newspaper
4 fanpage.it 49.00 5.00 national
news site
5 ansa.it 47.00 12.00 national
news site
6 huffingtonpost.it 40.00 7.20 national news
site
7 ilmessaggero.it 34.00 2.00 national
newspaper
8 ilsole24ore.com 32.00 4.00 national
newspaper
9 lercio.it 29.00 3.00 satire
10 tgcom24.mediaset.it 28.00 28.00 national
news site
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Figure 1. The relationship between the web traffic of a website (x-axis) and
the number of flags it received on Facebook (y-axis). Traffic is expressed in
PPVM, which indicates what fraction of all the page views by Alexa toolbar
users go to a particular site.
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other than the ones intended [24,25]. Recently, researchers
proposed methods to identify reliable users and improve, in
that way, the quality of the crowd signal [20,23].
Regardless of the ongoing efforts, fake news and mislead-
ing information still pollute online communications and no
immediate solution seems to be available. In 2018, Facebook
released, through the Social Science One initiative, the
Facebook URL Shares dataset [26], a preview of the larger
dataset released recently.2 The dataset contains the web
page addresses (URLs) shared by at least 20 unique accounts
on Facebook between January 2017 and June 2018. Together
with the URLs, the dataset also details whether the specific
link had been sent to the third-party fact-checkers that
collaborate with Facebook.
We accessed the most shared links in the Italian subset,
which revealed some curious patterns and inspired the pre-
sent work. We exclusively use this dataset for the
motivation and validation of our analysis, leaving the use
of the newer full dataset for future work.
Table 1 shows the top 10 most reported domains, which are
exclusivelymajor national newspapers, news sitesanda satirical
website.A further analysis of the data reveals, as figure 1 shows,
a positive correlation (y ¼ bxa fit, with slope α = 0.2, scale β =
1.22 and p < 0.0013) between a source’s popularity and the
number of times a domain has been checked by Facebook’s
third-party fact-checkers. We measure the popularity of the
source through Alexa’s (https://www.alexa.com) page views
per million users (PVPM). It is worth observing that all the
news reported in the top 10 most reported domains have been
fact-checkedas true legitimatenews (with the obvious exception
of the satirical website, which was fact-checked as satire).These observations create the background for the present
paper. Our hypothesis is that users are polarized and that
polarization is an important driver of the decision of whether
to flag or not a news item: a user will only flag it if it is not
perceived truthful enough and if it has a significantly differ-
ent bias from that of the user (polarity). Sharing the same
bias would act against the user’s flagging action. Thus, we
introduce a model of online news flagging that we call the
‘bipolar’ model, since we assume for simplicity that there
are only two poles—roughly corresponding to ‘liberal’ and
‘conservative’ in the US political system. The bipolar model
of news-flagging attempts to capture the main ingredients that
we observe in empirical research on fake news and disinforma-
tion—echo chambers, confirmation bias, platform-induced
polarizationand selective exposure.We showhow theproposed
model provides a reasonable explanation of the patterns thatwe
observe in Facebook data.
The current crowdsourced flagging systems seem to
assume a simpler flag-generating model. Despite being some-
how similar to the bipolar model we propose, in this simple
case the model does not account for users’ polarization, thus
we will call it the ‘monopolar’ model. In the monopolar
model, users do not gravitate around two poles and perceived
truthfulness constitutes the only parameter. Users flag
news items only if they perceive an excessive ‘fakeness’ of the
news item, depending of their degree of scepticism. We show
how the monopolar model relies on unrealistic expectations
and that it is unable to reproduce the observed flag-generating
patterns.
Lastly, we test the robustness of the bipolar model against
various configurations of the underlying network structure
and the actors’ behaviour. We show, on the one hand, how
the model is always able to explain the observed flagging
phenomenon and, on the other hand, that a complex social
network structure is a core element of the system.2. Methods
In this section, we present the main model on which we base the
results of this paper. It is possible to understand the bipolar and
monopolar models as a single model with or without users’
polarization. However, a user’s polarization has a significant
impact on the results, and it seriously affects the social network
underlying the flagging and propagation processes. For these
sources popularity
polarity
truth
users polarity
publish
reshare
degree
from friend
flag
fi,u =
ti
|pi – pu|
consume
fi,u = 1 –
fi,u
fi,u + 1
fi,u < r fi,u > f
Figure 2. The overview of the bipolar model. From left to right, we show: the characteristics of the agents (source’s polarities, popularity and truthfulness; and
user’s polarity); the model’s structures (the bipartite source–user follower network and the unipartite user–user social network); and the agents’ actions (source
publishing and users resharing, consuming and flagging news items).
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reasons, in the paper, we will refer to them as two different
models with two different names, which makes the comparison
easier to grasp.
In the following, we start by giving a general overview of the
bipolar model (§2.1). In the subsequent sections, we provide the
model details, motivating each choice on the basis of real-world
data. We conclude by showing the crucial differences between
the bipolar and monopolar models (§2.5).
We note that our model shares some commonalities with the
bounded confidence model [27].2.1. Model overview
Figure 2 shows a general depiction of the bipolarmodel. In the bipo-
lar model, we have two kinds of agents: news sources and users.
News sources are characterized by three values: popularity,
polarity and truthfulness. The popularity distributes broadly:
there are a few big players with a large following while the
majority of sources are followed by only a few users. The polarity
distributes quasi-normally. Most sources are neutral and there are
progressively fewer and fewer sources that are more polarized.
Truthfulness is linked to polarity, with more polarized sources
tending to be less truthful. This implies that most news sources
are truthful, and less trustworthy sources are more and more
rare. Each news item has the same polarity and truthfulness
values as the news source publishing it.
Users only have polarity. The polarity of the users distributes
in the same way as that of the news sources. Most users are
moderate and extremists are progressively more rare. Users
follow news sources, preferentially those of similar polarity
(selective exposure). Users embed in a social network, preferen-
tially being friends of other users of similar polarity (homophily).
A user can see a news item if the item is either published by a
source the user is following or reshared by one of their friends. In
either case, the user can do one of three things:
1. reshare—if the polarity of the item is sufficiently close to their
own and the item is sufficiently truthful;
2. flag—if the polarity of the item is sufficiently different from
their own or the item is not truthful enough;
3. consume—in all other cases, meaning that the item does not
propagate and nor is it flagged.
We expect the bipolar model to produce mostly flags in the
moderate and truthful part of the spectrum. We base this expec-
tation on the following reasoning. Since most news sources aremoderate and truthful, the few very popular sources are over-
whelmingly more likely to be moderate and truthful. Thus we
will see more moderate and truthful news items, which are
more likely to be reshared. This resharing activity will cause
the news items published by the moderate and truthful news
sources to be shared to the polarized parts of the network.
Here, given that the difference between the polarization of the
user and the polarization of the source plays a role in flagging
even relatively truthful items, moderate and truthful news
items are likely to be flagged.
Polarized and untruthful items, on the other hand, are unli-
kely to be reshared. Because of the polarization homophily that
characterizes the network structure, they are unlikely to reach
the more moderate parts of the network. If polarized items
are not shared, they cannot be flagged. A neutral item is more
likely to be shared, and thus could reach a polarized user, who
would flag it. Thus, most flags will hit moderate and truthful
news items, rendering the whole flagging mechanism unsuitable
for discovering untruthful items.
2.2. Agents
In this section, we detail how we build the main agents in our
model: the news sources and the users.
As mentioned previously, news sources have a certain popu-
larity. The popularity of a news source is the number of users
following it. We generate the source popularity distribution as
a power law. This means that the vast majority of news sources
have a single follower, while the most popular sources have
thousands of followers.
This is supported by real-world data. Figure 3a shows the
complement cumulative distribution of the number of followers
of Facebook pages. These data come from CrowdTangle.4 As
we can see, the distribution has a long tail: two out of three Face-
book pages have 10 000 followers or fewer. The most popular
pages are followed by more than 60 million users.
As for the user and source polarities (pu and pi), we assume that
they distribute quasi-normally. We create a normal distribution
with average equal to zero and standard deviation equal to 1.
Then we divide it by its maximum absolute value to ensure that
the distribution fully lies between −1 and 1. In this way we
ensure that most users are moderates; more extreme users/sources
are progressively more rare, at both ends of the spectrum.
This is also supported by the literature [28] and by real-world
data. Figure 3b shows the distribution of political leaning in the
USA across time [29], collected online.5 These data were collected
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Figure 3. (a) The cumulative distribution of source popularity on Facebook in our dataset: the probability (y-axis) of a page to have a given number of followers or
more (x-axis). (b) The polarity distribution in the USA from 1994 (light) to 2016 (dark). Biannual observation, except for missing years 2006, 2010 and 2014. EL,
extremely liberal; L, liberal; SL, slightly liberal; M, moderate; DK, don’t know; SC, slightly conservative; C, conservative; EC, extremely conservative.
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by surveying a representative sample of the US electorate via
phone and face-to-face interviews.
While not perfectly normally distributed, the data show that
the majority of Americans either feel they are moderate or do not
know to which side they lean. ‘Moderate’ or ‘don’t know’ is
always the mode of the distribution, and their combination
is always the plurality option.
Finally, sources have a degree of truthfulness ti. Here, we
make the assumption that this is correlated with the news
source’s polarity. The more a source is polarized, the less it is
interested in the actual truth. A polarized source wants to
bring readers onto their side, and their ideology clouds their
best judgement of truthfulness. This reasonable assumption is
also supported by the literature [30].
Mathematically, this means that ti = 1− |pi| + ϵ, with −0.05≤
ϵ≤ 0.05 being extracted uniformly at random, ensuring then that ti
remains between 0 and 1 by capping it to these values.
2.3. Structures
There are two structures in the model: the user–source bipartite
network and the user–user social network.
2.3.1. User–source network
The user–source network connects users to the news sources they
are following. This is the primary channel through which users
are exposed to news items.
We fix the degree distribution of the sources to be a power law,
as we detailed in the previous section. The degree distribution of
the user depends on the other rules of the model. There is a certain
number of users with degree zero in this network. These users do
not follow any news source and only react to what is shared by
their circle of friends. We think this is reasonably realistic.
We connect users to sources to maximize polarity homophily.
The assumption is that users will follow news organizations
sharing their polarity. This assumption is supported by the
literature [31,32].
For each source with a given polarity and popularity, we pick
the required number of individuals with polarity values in an
interval around the source polarity. For instance, if a source
has popularity of 24 and polarity of 0.5, we will pick the 24
users whose polarity is closest to 0.5 and we will connect them
to the source.
2.3.2. Social network
Users connect to each other in a social network. The social net-
work is the channel through which users are exposed to news
items from sources they are not following.We aim at creating a social network with realistic character-
istics. For this reason, we generate it via an Lancichinetti–
Fortunato–Radicchi (LFR) benchmark6 [33]. The LFR benchmark
ensures that the social network has a community structure, a
broad degree distribution, and communities are overlapping,
i.e. they can share nodes. All these characteristics are typical of
real-world social networks. We fix the number of nodes to
≈16 000, while the number of communities is variable and not
fixed by the LFR’s parameters.
We need an additional feature in the social network: polarity
homophily. People are more likely to be friends with like-minded
individuals. This is supported by studies of politics on social
media [34].We ensure homophily by iterating over all communities
generated by the LFRbenchmark and assigning to users grouped in
the same community a portion of the polarity distribution.
For instance, if a community includes 12 nodes, we take 12 con-
secutive values in the polarity distribution and we assign them
to the users. This procedure generates extremely high polarity
assortativity. The Pearson correlation of the polarity values at the
two endpoints of each edge is ≈0.89.2.4. Actions
A news source publishes to all the users following it an item i
carrying the source’s polarity pi and truthfulness ti. Every time
a user sees an item i, it calculates how acceptable the item is,
using the function fi,u. An item is acceptable if it is (i) truthful
and (ii) it is not far from the user in the polarity spectrum—
experiments [35] show how this is a reasonable mechanics:
users tend to trust more sources with a similar polarity to their
own. Mathematically, (i) means that fi,u is directly proportional
to ti; while (ii) means that fi,u is inversely proportional to the
difference between pi and pu
fi,u ¼ tijpi  puj :
The acceptability function fi,u has two issues: first, its domain
spans from 0 (if ti = 0) to +∞ (if pi = pu). This can be solved by the
standard transformation x/(x + 1), which is always between 0
and 1 if x≥ 0.
Second, for the discussion of our parameters and results, it is
more convenient to estimate a degree of ‘unacceptability’, which
is the opposite of the acceptability fi,u. This can be achieved by
the standard transformation 1− x. Putting the two transformations
together, the unacceptability fi,u of item i for user u is
fi,u ¼ 1 fi,ufi,u þ 1 :
U5
S2S1
U3U1 U7U2 U4 U6
pi = 0.5
ti = 0.55
pu = 0.8 pu = 0.6 pu = 0.4 pu = 0.2 pu = –0.2
pu = –0.45pu = 0
pi = –0.5
ti = 0.45
Figure 4. Two simple structures with sources (squares) and users (circles). Edges connect sources to the users following them and users to their friends. Each source
has an associated ti and pi value and each user has an associated pu value next to their respective nodes.
Table 2. The fi,u value for each user–source pair from figure 4 in the (a)
bipolar and (b) monopolar models.
(a) bipolar’s fi,u (b) monopolar’s fi,u
user S1 S2 user S1 S2
U1 0.35 0.74 U1 0.45 0.55
U2 0.15 0.71 U2 0.45 0.55
U3 0.15 0.66 U3 0.45 0.55
U4 0.35 0.61 U4 0.45 0.55
U5 0.48 0.52 U5 0.45 0.55
U6 0.56 0.40 U6 0.45 0.55
U7 0.62 0.10 U7 0.45 0.55
Table 3. The number of flags each source in figure 4 gets in the (a)
bipolar and (b) monopolar models, for varying values of ρ and ϕ.
(a) bipolar (b) monopolar
ρ ϕ S1 S2 ρ ϕ S1 S2
0.67 0.7 0 2 0.67 0.7 0 0
0.57 0.6 1 1 0.57 0.6 0 0
0.49 0.54 1 1 0.49 0.54 0 1
0.36 0.44 2 0 0.36 0.44 4 1
0.2 0.3 2 1 0.2 0.3 4 1
0.1 0.6 0 0 0.1 0.6 0 0
0.1 0.5 0 0 0.1 0.5 0 1
0.1 0.14 4 0 0.1 0.14 4 1
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsif
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Users have a finite tolerance for how unacceptable a news
item can be. If the item exceeds this threshold, meaning
fi,u . f, the user will flag the item. On the other hand, if the
news item has low to zero unacceptability, meaning fi,u , r,
the user will reshare it to their friends. If r  fi,u  f, the user
will neither flag nor reshare the item.
The parameters ϕ and ρ regulate which and how many news
items are flagged, and thus we need to tune them to generate
realistic results—as we do in the Results section.
2.5. Monopolar model
The monopolar model is the result of removing everything
related to polarity from the bipolar model. The sharing and flag-
ging criteria are the same as in the bipolar model—testing fi,u
against the ρ and ϕ parameters, with the difference being in
how fi,u is calculated. The unacceptability of a news item is
now simply the opposite of its truthfulness, i.e. fi,u ¼ 1 ti.
Moreover, in the monopolar model users connect to random
news sources and there is no polarity homophily in the
social network.
Themonopolarmodel attempts to reproduce the assumption of
real-world crowdsourced flagging systems: only the least truthful
articles are flagged. However, we argue that it is not a good rep-
resentation of reality because truthfulness assessment is not an
objective process: it is a subjective judgement and it includes pre-
existing polarization of both sources and users. The bipolar model
can capture such polarization while the monopolar model cannot.
2.6. Example
To understand what happens in the bipolar and monopolar
models, consider figure 4 as a toy example. Table 2a,b calculates
fi,u for all user–source pairs in the bipolar and monopolar
models, respectively. Table 3a,b counts the number of flags
received by each source for different combinations of the ρ and
ϕ parameters in the bipolar and monopolar models, respectively.
A few interesting differences between the bipolar and monopolar
models appear.
In the monopolar model, only the direct audience of a source
can flag its news items and, if one member of the direct audience
flags, so will all of them. This is because fi,u is equal for all nodes,
thus either fi,u . f and the entire audience will flag the item (and
no one will reshare it) or fi,u , r and the entire network—not just
the audience—will reshare the item, and no one will ever flag it.
This is not true for the bipolar model. S1 (figure 4) can be
either flagged by its entire audience (ϕ = 0.14); by part of its audi-
ence (ϕ = 0.3); or by nodes who are not in its audience at all (users
U5 and U6 for ϕ = 0.44; or user U7 for ϕ = 0.6). On the other hand,
in our examples, S2 is never flagged by its audience (U7). WhenS2 is flagged, it is always because it percolated to a user for
which fi,u . f, via a chain of users for which fi,u , r, because
fi,u is not constant across users any longer.3. Results
3.1. Parameter tuning
Before looking at the results of the model, we need to identify
the range of parameter values that can support robust and
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Figure 5. (a) The number of flags ( y-axis) in the bipolar model for different values of ϕ (x-axis). (b) The slope difference (colour; red = high, green = low) between
the real world and the bipolar fit between the source popularity and the number of flags received, per combination of ϕ and ρ values (x–y axis).
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realistic results. The most important of the two parameters
is ϕ, because it determines the number of flags generated in
the system.
Figure 5a shows the total number of flags generated per
value of ϕ. As expected, the higher the ϕ, the fewer the
flags, as the user finds more news items acceptable. The
sharp drop means that, for ϕ > 0.6, we do not have a sufficient
number of flags to support our observation of the model’s be-
haviour. Thus, hereafter, we will only investigate the
behaviour of the model for ϕ≤ 0.6.
ρ is linked to ϕ; specifically, its value is capped by ϕ. Aworld
with ρ≥ ϕ is unreasonable, because it would be a scenario
where a user feels enough indignation by an item that they
will flag it, but then they will also reshare it to their social
network. Thus, we only test scenarios in which ρ < ϕ.
Another important question is what combination of ϕ and
ρ values generates flags that can reproduce the observed
relation between source popularity and the number of flags
we see in figure 1. To do so, we perform a grid search, testing
many combinations of ϕ–ρ values. Our quality criterion is the
absolute difference in the slope of the power fit between
popularity and the number of flags. The lower the difference,
the better the model is able to approximate reality.
Figure 5b shows such a relationship. We can see that there
is an area of high performance at all levels of ϕ.3.2. Bipolar model
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the polarity of the flagged
news items, for different values of ϕ and setting ρ = 0.08, an
interval including the widest spectrum of goodness of fit as
shown in figure 5b. We run the model 50 times and take
the average of the results, to smooth out random fluctuations.
We can see that our hypothesis is supported: in a polarized
environment the vastmajorityof flaggednews items areneutral.
This happens for ϕ≤ 0.3, which, as we saw in figure 5b, is the
most realistic scenario. For ϕ≥ 0.4, our hypothesis would not
be supported, but, as we can see in figure 5b, this is the area in
red, where the model is a bad fit for the observations
anyway—since here we are looking at ρ = 0.08 results.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of truthfulness of the
flagged items. These distributions show that, by flagging
following their individual polarization, users in the bipolar
model end up flagging the most truthful item they can—if
ϕ is high enough, items with ti∼ 1 cannot be flagged almost
regardless of the polarity difference.The two observations put togethermean that, in the bipolar
model, the vast majority of flags come from extremists who are
exposed to popular neutral and truthful news. The extremists
do not follow the neutral and truthful news sources, but get
in contact with neutral and truthful viewpoints because of
their social network.
The bipolar model results—in accordance with the obser-
vation from figure 1—suggest that more popular items are
shared more and thus flagged more. One could be tempted to
identifyandremove fakenews itemsby taking theones receiving
more than their fair shares of flags given their popularity. How-
ever, such a simple systemwould not work in reality. Figure 1 is
based on data coming after Facebook’s machine learning pre-
processor, the aim of which is to minimize false positives.7
Thus, even after controlling for a number of factors—source
popularity, reputation, etc.—most reported flags still end up
attached to high-popularity, high-reputability sources.3.3. Monopolar model
In the monopolar model, we remove all aspects related to
polarity, thus we cannot show the polarity distribution of
the flags. Moreover, as we have shown in §2.6, the effect of
ρ and ϕ is marginal. Thus we only show in figure 8 the truth-
fulness distribution of the flags, for only ϕ = 0.1 and ρ = 0.08,
noting that all other parameter combinations result in a
practically identical distribution.
The monopolar results show the flag truthfulness
distribution as the ideal result. The distribution shows a dispro-
portionate number of flags going to low truthfulness news
items, as they should—the drop for the lowest truthfulness
value is due to the fact that there are few items at that low
level of truthfulness, and that they are not reshared.
Is this ideal result realistic? If we use the same criterion as
we used for the bipolar model to evaluate the quality of the
monopolar model, the answer is no. The absolute slope
difference in the popularity–flag regression between obser-
vation and the monopolar model is ≈0.798 for all ϕ–ρ
combinations. This is a significantly worse performance
than the worst-performing versions of the bipolar model—
figure 5b shows that no bipolar version goes beyond a
slope difference of 0.5.
Thus we can conclude that the monopolar model is not a
realistic representation of reality, even if we would expect it to
correctly flag the untruthful news items. The bipolar model
is a better approximation, and results in flagging truthful
news items.
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Figure 6. Flag count per polarity of items at different flaggability thresholds ϕ for the bipolar model. Reshareability parameter ρ = 0.08. Average of 50 runs.
(a) ϕ = 0.1, (b) ϕ = 0.2, (c) ϕ = 0.3, (d ) ϕ = 0.4, (e) ϕ = 0.5 and ( f ) ϕ = 0.6.
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3.4. Robustness
Our bipolarmodelmakes a numberof simplifying assumptions
that we need to test. First, we are showing results for a model
in which all news sources have the same degree of activity,
meaning that each source will publish exactly one news item.
This is not realistic: data from Facebook pages show that there
is a huge degree of activity heterogeneity (figure 9a).
There is a mild positive correlation between the popular-
ity of a page and its degree of activity (log-log Pearson
correlation of ≈0.12; figure 9b). For this reason, we use the
real-world distribution of page popularity and we lock it in
with its real-world activity level. This is the weighted bipolar
model, in which each synthetic news source is the model’s
equivalent of a real page, with its popularity and activity.
A second simplifying assumption of the bipolar model is
that the reshareability and flaggability parameters ρ and ϕ arethe same for every individual in the social network. However,
people might have different trigger levels. Thus we create the
variable bipolar model, where each user has its own ρu and
ϕu. These values are distributed normally, with their average
r ¼ 0:08 (and standard deviation 0.01) and f depending on
which average value of ϕ we are interested in studying
(with the standard deviation set to one-eighth of f ).
Figure 10 shows the result of the weighted and variable
variants against the original bipolar model. In figure 10a,
we report the dispersion (standard deviation) of the polariz-
ation values of the flags. A low dispersion means that flags
cluster in the neutral portion of the polarity spectrum, mean-
ing that most flags signal neutral news items. In figure 10b,
we report the average truthfulness of flagged items.
We can see that taking into account the pages’ activities
increases the dispersion by a negligible amount and only
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Figure 7. Flag count per truthfulness of items at different flaggability thresholds ϕ for the bipolar model. Reshareability parameter ρ = 0.08. Average of 50 runs.
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for high values of ϕ. This happens because there could be
some extremely active fringe pages spamming fake content,
which increases the likelihood of extreme flags. There is no
difference in the average truthfulness of flagged items.
Having variable ϕ and ρ values, instead, actually decreases
dispersion, making the problem worse—although only for
larger values of ϕ. In this configuration, a very tolerant society
with high (average) ϕ would end up flagging mostly neutral
reporting—as witnessed by the higher average truthfulness
of the reported items. This is because lower-than-average ρu
users will be even less likely to reshare the most extreme
news items.
So far we have kept the reshareability parameter constant
at ρ = 0.08. If we change ρ (figure 11) the dispersion of a flag’s
polarity (figure 11a) and its average truthfulness value
(figure 11b) do not significantly change. The changes are
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Figure 9. (a) The cumulative distribution of source activity in Facebook in our dataset: the probability (y-axis) of a news source sharing a given number of items or
more (x-axis). (b) The relationship between activity (x-axis) and popularity (y-axis) in our Facebook dataset.
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10due to the fact that ρ simply affects the number of flags: a
higher ρ means that users are more likely to share news
items. More shares imply more news items percolating
through the social network and thus more flags.
The bipolar model contains many elements besides the ρ
and ϕ parameters. For instance, it imposes that the social net-
work has several communities and that social relationships
are driven by homophily. These two elements are based on
existing literature, yetwe should test their impact on themodel.
First, keeping everything else constant, the no-homophily
variant allows users to connect to friends ignoring their
polarity value. In other words, polarity is randomly distribu-
ted in the network. Second, keeping everything else constant,
the no-community variant uses an Erdős–Rényi random
graph as the social network instead of an LFR benchmark.
The Erdős–Rényi graph extracts connections between nodes
uniformly at random and thus it has, by definition, no com-
munity structure.
Figure 12 shows the impact on flag polarity dispersion
(figure 12a) and average truthfulness (figure 12b). The
no-homophily variant of the bipolar model has a significantly
higher dispersion in the flag polarity distribution, and lower
truthfulness average, and the difference is stable (though
stronger for values of ρ above 0.3). This means that polarity
homophily is playing a key role in ensuring that flags are pre-
dominantly assigned to neutral news items: if we remove it,
the accuracy in spotting fake news increases.
In contrast, removing the community structure from the net-
work will result in a slightly smaller dispersion of flag’s polarity
and higher average flag truthfulness. The lack of communities
might cause truthful items to spread more easily, and thus be
flagged, increasing the average flag truthfulness.4. Discussion
In this paper, we show how the assumption of traditional
crowdsourced content policing systems is unreasonable.
Expecting users to flag content carries the problematic assump-
tion that a user will genuinely attempt to estimate the veracity
of a news item to the best of their capacity. Even if that was a
reasonable expectation to have, a user’s estimation of veracity
will be made within their individual view of the world and
variable polarization. This will result in assessments that will
give an easier pass to biased content if they share such bias.
This hypothesis is supported by our bipolar agent-based
model. The model shows that even contexts that are extremely
tolerant towards different opinions, represented by our flagg-
ability parameter ϕ, would still mostly flag neutral content,
and produce results that fit well with observed real-world
data. Moreover, by testing the robustness of our model, we
show how our results hold both for the amount of heterogen-
eity of source activity and for individual differences in both
tolerance and propagation attitudes.
Removing polarization from the model, and thus testing
what we defined as the monopolar model, attempts to repro-
duce the assumptions that would make a classical content
policy system work. The monopolar model, while seemingly
based on reasonable assumptions, is not largely supported
by established literature in the area of online behaviour
and social interaction, differently from the bipolar model.
Moreover, it is not able to deliver on its promises in terms
of ability to represent real-world data.Our paper has a number of weaknesses and possible
future directions. First, our main results are based on a simu-
lated agent-based model. The results hold as long as the
assumptions and the dynamics of the models are an accurate
approximation of reality. We provided evidence to motivate
the bipolar model’s assumptions, but there could still be fac-
tors unaccounted for, such as the role of originality [36] or of
spreaders’ effort [37] in making content go viral. Second,
many aspects of the model were fixed and should be investi-
gated. For instance, there is a strong polarity homophily
between users and news sources, and in user–user connec-
tions in the social network. We should investigate whether
such strong homophily is really supported in real-world scen-
arios. Third, the model has an essentially static structure. The
users will never start/stop following news sources, nor
befriend/unfriend fellow users. Such actions are common
in real-world social systems and should be taken into
account. Fourth the model only assumes news stories worth
interacting with. This is clearly different from the reality
where, in a context of overabundant information, most stories
are barely read and collect few reshares or flags. Including
those news stories in the model could certainly affect the
overall visibility of other items. Finally, the model does not
take into account reward and cost functions for both users
and news sources. What are the repercussions for a news
source of having its content flagged? Should news sources
attempt to become mainstream and gather following? Such
reward/cost mechanisms are likely to greatly influence our
outcomes. We plan to address the last two points in future
expansions of our model.
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